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to sever

The jury returned a verdict of guilty for both M s. i'vfoskios ;rnd :Ms. Martindale.
At trial, certain facts came to iight the two female co-defendants ·..vere the
signifi cant others of the tw o male co-defendants. who were brothers. l\1s Moskios and

Carlos Pinto were residences of Ore2:on 2. t the tinw or the nlleged offense. while Ms
~

~

,

Martindale and Brian Pinto lived together iJ1 Idaho The two male co-defondant s ha d a
relationship \,vhich :nvolved illegal sales of marijuana, in th e transport to each other and in
the sales to other individual s

I

Ms. 1\/foskios was in a vehicle dri ven by !Vlr Carlos Pinto

which contained a large quantity of ma rijw1na (2 l pounds transported in the car of rvis
Moskios, while

i 8 poun ds \\ ~re fo und in the home of J\ fs . fartindaleJ whi le on a trip

from central Oregon to fdaho v,-i th their chil d in the vehici c, on December l 0 th, 2009 Ms
Martindale was living in a home \\itb Brian Pinto where the rna rijuana \.1,·as brought to and
held

The t rial was not li mited to the facts of the event:' on December !IJ°', 2009, and for
variou s reasons testimony centered upon the history of dm g dealing between the t,,,vo men,

and the amounts of money earn ed and assets owned by the respective couples. The

I
I

ul timate question in the tria! was th e knowledge, and ultimately actual or constnictive
possession of the marij uana by the respective females, and thi s was shown through
testimony regarding the facts surrounding their respective circumstances, not much of

which was similar or coincided ·.vith each-other, resuiting in a confusion of issues and lack
of organization to the cases.

2

\\

certa1n
to

'
vame

(See Transcript of Jury T rial. da" l, at page 63 ) The evich:'nce which t he Stnt e sought 10

admit was co ncerning

k11\J \ \

le dge or part ic ip:n ion in otb -r drug deali ng or trans.-ictions

that had allegedly taken place invo lving t he codefendants. in th,..; case who had already
entered guilty pleas at the time of the trial for the Jbove named appe!laJ1t Essenti ally, the
State sought to admit evicfonce that the above- named Appellant, !\'ls JVl oski o s. and her

codefendant had participated in sc1111e way in prio r dm g tr~in sactions, or th at they had
previ ously possessed drn gs, for the purpose of dea ling a nd profited fron.1 it. The State

I

argued such ev idence was reievant as an except io n to LR E 404 (b) in that it showed
intent to possess the drugs at issue in the present case. (See Transcri pt of Ju ry Triai, day I,
at 67.)
f:fo y1/ever. the Judge at tr:a! n: led cli.:arl y that he woul d not allow in any of the
aforementioned evide nce, un less it ,vas for the purpose of rebuttal or impeachment, due to
its prejud icial effect and, due to a lack of direct r,Jcvance to the cri me charged, stating on
the reco rd that , "because of the fact that the defendant is not cha rged with being pa1i of
t he business in this pa rticula r case or.

I

A fi nancial interest in the selling of the

Thus., the court made clear thctt no evidence wa. to be admissible that was not
directly related to the charge at hand, namely. the po ssession of the particular marijuana
th e defendant/appellant was alleged to have possessed on that day The counsel on appeal
alleges th at this was, in fact the correct ruling on the issue . Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not ad missibie to prove the chara cter of a person to show action in
conformity therew ith. I.RE 404 (b); Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P 3d at 283. It is well
settled law that in order t o be admissible, such evidence must fall into a permissible
-f.

purpose, such as proof of morive, opportun ity, inlen1. preparn tfo n, identity, or a general
pian . See Stole

l '.

Kremer,, 160 P.3d 443 (2007j It is in cu mbent upon the state to show

hmv th.i s evidence is permissible, and is not merely character evidence

In thi:,. case, the

State argued that evidence ought to be admi ssibie to show that the defend ant intended to
posSPSS

the marijuana, an element of the offense.
Idaho couns taking a look at evidence such a th.is in recent rulings have held that.

"triai cour1s must carefully 5crutin.i z~ evidence offered a.s ··corroboration" or as
de.monstra ting a ''co n moo scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of
evidence that i merely probativ of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal
behavi0 r" State "· Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P 3d at 1185 (2009)

It is the defendant' s

positi n that allovving in evidence of the appellams ' knowledge and/or participation of
prior drug tra nsactions, or their profit therefrom was not relevant to sh o · their intent to
possess the particular drugs alleged in this in tance, and that any such evi dence would be
unduly prejudicai and tending to show mere propensity, ·which is prohibited, and that

I
I
I

therefo re, the Ju dge's ruling on the i ·su e was con ect. The a!le ed evi dence sought to be
admitted, was not charged cond uct, but presumably the allegati ons of other witnesses
regarding what the defendant/appellants knew or participated in as far as drng activities on
prior occasions. "Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to
I R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to
der:.1o nstrate the defendant' s propensity to engage in such behavior ,- Id 1n order to be
admissible evidence uncl er

r. R.E

4C!..\- (b )., the prior bad act must a1so be "relevant to a

material disputed issue to d1e crime charged, other than pro pensity " State v. Pokorney,
149 Idaho 459, 235 P.3d 409 (2010).
5

h is Ms l\ loskios' p1Jsit ion tha t, whil e the ruling was e-o rrect, ceriain evidence
was admitted duri ng the tria l \\ hich was ru led impe,nn.i;siblc per that n tl tng. E vidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts by the appell ants in the case which was expressly prohibited

by the Judg e's ruling was admitted, such as During the direct examination of detecti ve
Berrier by the State, beginning on page 150 of the Jury Trial T ranscript, he testifies
regarding Ms

Martindale' s know-ledge of drug dealing activities within their home,

relating to previous occasio ns \ hen indi viduals \Vould come to the residence, stay for a

I

sho11 period of time, and then leave. Th.s i~ evidence not directly relating to the intent to
possess the marijuana on December 101.r', L009 , as alleged, but to th

defendant's

k.no1vledg e of previous drug dealing activities, whi ch the court had ru led impermissible
and prej udi ciaL On redirect.. the State again questions Oflicer Barrier, this t ime mo re
directly, ab out the defendant ' s kno wledge of drug act ivity (one should point out this
o ccu rs after the State has renev,;ed its motion t o admit e ·idence pursu ant t o I R .E 404
(b}, allegi ng that the defense had opened the door upon cross to th is issue, and that motion
being denied) b_ ask ing whether pe ople going to a bedroom and stayi ng for shoii periods

I
I

of time is consistent ,\rit h sal es of marijuana. (See Jury Tri al Transcript, page 200 )
Throughout the direct examina tion by the State of Ro bert Tomlinson, th e
q uestioning refers to the relationship of the two primary drug dealers, ~vtr Tomlinson, and
Carlos Pint os, the boyfriend of Ms. Moskios. T he questions relate to the frequency and
nature of drug transactions bet w een t he tv,·o, which the appell.ant would argue is not
relevant to the elements of the offen~e charged, since neither of rhem were on trial for
their drug activities at the time, and the only possible relevance ,vas that which was
addressed and prohibited by the evidence ruled and prohibited by I.RE 404 (b ): That
6

these fou r individuals had a consi:;ten t ,111d ongo ing drng- dealing relationship, and that
therefore the two co-cl efen dallts on trial ,1l the time. , 1s. i\'loskios and 1\1s. l\ Iartindale
must. have had kno\iv!edge of it. (See Jury trial transcript. pages 220-243 .)

During the cro:s-e .amination of Carlo:; Pinto by the State (S ee Jury Trial
Transcript , page 383-4 JO ). Mr Pi nto was questioned on

e nature of hi s ongoing drug -

sales (all of which was also outside the scope of the dire ·t examination by tie defense
counsel, see below), the lifestyle he led up m those proceeds, including the amount earned
and the assets owned off of drug ales The counsel for the defense would argue that this
is all in direct vio ation of the order by the coun regarding impermissible I.RE 404 (b)
evidence The Judge specifically stated his ruiing was pertinent to the previous possession
and profits from the drugs in the past. (Se e id. at 6 7 ) Furthennore, the questioning on
cross- examination

ent into the issue of whether or not I ls. foskios had knowledge of

the extent of Mr. Pinto' s marijuana grow operations. (See le( at 387-3 88.) The attorney
for the State even asks him di rectly whether or not Ms Moskios had knowledge of the
rnarijuana dealing. (Id ) The cross- exami nation al so heavily deals with qu estioning into

I
I

the iifestyle and assets and the price of those assets. The only possible relevance to this is
to show the extent of the drng dealing that had been occurring and JV1s. IV!oskios' iikely
knowledge of it and profit from it, all of which is in direct violation of the ruling of the
court, and is highly prejudicial.
The counsel for the defendant objects when Mr. Pinto is cross- examined as to
whether Ms. Moskios had traveled before with rnarijuana in the car, for the reasons that
such questioning is outside the sccµe cf direct- examinatiori Rnd that it is irrelevant to the
present charge. (See Id; at 408 ) The c-Jrni over-mles the objection, as the State suggests

it is bein g offered for impeachm ent pu rposes, as during direct exmrJ nation he stated Ms.
I\.loskios couldn · t bel ie, c li e haJ tra veled v, ith drug:: in the car with her there (Jd ) The
entire line of questioning that continues is \\ith regard to Jld s. ~fo ski os ' past knowledge of

I

the drug opernt.ions, which does not appear to be offered for impeachment purposes. (lei,

at 412- '-113 ) This entire questioning is highly prejudicial , and for the reasons it was held
impermissi ble due to I R E 404 (b), it ought to have been excluded. The questions
regarding Ms. Mo skio s' pa st knowi edge of drug activities, su ch as, ·' She knew that you
hrr'l
j (• .h1 ·Y>,:,
·uan°
t~.,.u,_t51...,l
1. !nls·1·J
... .c<-t

rl o···n
(\ ·Tei
6) _ ct'o r1·ot
\\l_, t 1... ·
.Bo1·c:e
~}- , n·ght')"
:;,_, .. "" :
'· · _, ·at 4 1?
.... , lt.ne
•
---i

i

.

0

nnear to
l)p
..
u ...., 1·n
~-

c...1Jt-'

impeachment of any statements by the witness, and therefore ought to have been excluded.

1L Jh e qu estio nin2.

UQOn cross- exami nati on of Mr Pinto by the State
was outside the scope of the direct exami nati on, and therefore ou2:ht
to ha ve been excluded.

Upon direct examinatio n of Mr. Carlos Pinto, the questi ons the ,;vitness was ask ed
were limited to the specific eve-nts in question as alleged in the complaint Hmvever, upon
cross- examination. the counsel fo r rhe State questions the 1vitness as to his activities prior

I
I

to December 10 . 2009, including where be v'/aS v,rork:ng (Id,, at 383, line 18) and the

defense counsel objects that this is outside the scope of direct. This objection is overruled
and the line of questio ning thus proceeds. (See id at 3 84.)
l. R E. 6 J l (b) provides, ''Cross- examination should be limited to the subject

matter of the direct examination and to matters affecting the credibility of the witness The
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on
direct examination."

8

Ms . M oskios in this appe,ll recognize - ilw t \Vliethcr to allo,, qu estioning outside
the scope of direct i:- with in

t lk

<,ound discretion of the trial judgl\ and will not be

di sturbed on appeal absent a cl ear showing of abuse of that discretion . (See Seate v.
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 247 P 3d 204, (20 10), ciling Smte \'. Smith, 117 ldaho 225.,

232, 786 P 2d 11 27., 1134 (1990) The questio n is whether in thi:s case there was an abuse
of tbat discreti on It is the position oftli~ appellant thill there \\ as, in fact, an abuse ofthat
di cretion in th e line of questio ni ng \Vhich was allow ed upon the cross- examination of Mr
Pinto for the folim,ving reaso ns: the entire line of questioning which ensued on cross-

I

exarninati on was to matters concerni ng the prio r extent of his drng dealing activities and
how rnu ch of it l\l s Moskios knew about Therefore, it was for the purpose of enteri ng
into a scope and territory whicl1 had been prohibiied by the ruling upon the I. R E. 404(6)
lt was essentially to elucidc1 te the eztent of her kno , !edge of drug dealing activities and

the extent of those activities of her husband. Whil e couns have held thar the appropriate
scope of cross- examination is also to facts connected 'vvith those facts, or to matters
which can explain, modif)1 or qualify the testi mony on direct, (See Stale

l'

S'tany , 96 Idaho

148, 150, 525 P 2d 343, 34:'i (1 974)o in this ca se the totality of the picture of the cross
examination was to veer off into painting a picture not of the facts of the day in question
and to Iv1s. Moskios' participa tion in it, but int o their entire liveiihood and the connection
of iliegal drug sales to it Essentially this witness woul d have been unable to testify at all as
to the matters at hand and Ms . Moskios ' parti cipation in it that day ,vithout opening the
door to the previously prohibited 404 (b) evidence. There Core, in this case, the scope of
the cross-examination ought to have been limited to the matters connected with the direct
examination. The State was able to effectively admit statements of the defendant which
9
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1.,
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at
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matter on
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that
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were

for Ms.

not

found guilty
case
10

to

parse through and understand not just 1 ie facts themselves, but

rvrs.

Moskios ' relatirmship

cmd knowledge of those.facts.

C. Standard qf Revh:!w
\V hether a lower court im properly jo: ·1ed offenses is a question of law over ,vhich
appellate courts exerci se free review. State \' Cook 144 fdah o 784.. I 71 P 3d 1282
(2007)

I

\Vnile an abuse of discreti on standard is applied when revie\,ving a denial of a

motion to sever pursua nt to t C. R. 14, that ru le presurnes joind er is proper in the first
place

When reviewi ng the appropriatene:::s of initiai j oinder, the Court exerci ses free

review . Id, citing State

1•.

Field , 144 !daho 559, 16 5 P 3d 273 (2007).

D Argurnent
Whether joinder of offenses is proper is determined by 1,v, hat is alleged., not by what
the proofalleged!y sho ws

Stare

1·

Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P 3d 1282 (2007) In this

case, there was no real nexus of offenses for th e two defendants, other than one's

I
I
I

significant other had sold drugs to the other ' s sig nificant other. /JI of the rest of the facts
and circumstances w hich the j ury had to consider w ere those surrounding each
defendant's knowledge and likelihood of dom inion and control over the drugs in their
possession. For Ms. t foskios, it w as the quest ion of delivery, and the facts surrounding
the transportation on that part icular day of the drugs in the vehicle, and whether she could
have jumped out of the vehicie or should ha,.,e done something to stop the transpo1i. For
Ms. Martindale, it was the facts of the drngs in her home, whi ch room they were in, when
they were taken there, and how likely she was to have known about it And then there
1i

were the fact s about their lives that came in with rega rd to the history of the respective
men 's d rng dealing µra.cbces All o f thi s only served to blur together and result in
confosio n., both in d osing arguments and during test imony
Therefore, un der the standards set forth, JOi ncl er m this case w as not proper
Fu,iherm ore, the defendants ' counsel shouid have kno w n t hat by faili ng to make a motion
for severance o f the case s . prejudice to them would result through co nfusion of the
issu es., and spillover of the issues

In past cases, where there is an issue of spillover of issues, ,vhich could result in
confosion fo the j ury, f daho courts have held that an adr 10nishi ng at the t ime the separate
evidence is intro du ced and at the time of deliberation, is sufficient ,\'ee State v Fox , 52

fdaho 47 4, 16 P 2d 663, Idaho 1932.

I

fn this case, it \VOuld have b en nearly impossible

to give such ad mo nishing at the time of ti e introduction o f separate evidence, as almost all
testimony could ha ve only been in regard to eith er one or t he other of the defendants,
since the facts and circumstances did not overlap
Therfore, it is the position of the oppellant that a nev.r trial is warranted on t he basis
that consolidaiton was in the first place improper; or in the alternati ve, that a motion to
sever should ha ve been brought, and that failure to so so resulted in such prejudice to the

I

appellant that it rises to the levei of ineffective as~istance of counsel in this case.

IV

The Failure to File for Severance of t he Jury Trials Amounts to
Ineffective Assistance of C unsel as a Deficiencv of representation
that Prejudiced Ms. M oskios in her tri al .

While the Appellant is avvare tha t it is well established that ineffective assistance of

12

counsel claims are preferably brought th.rough an applicarion for post-conviction relief
Ms Moskio s believes that in this case the error not to file for severance of the jury tri als

of the rwo defendants is so frmdamental : rnd \Vas so severely prejudic ial in her case, that it
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel and is therefo re properly brought on di rect
appeal (See Stale v. Alle!i . 123 [d:1 ho 880 . 88 2, 853 P 2d 625 , 62 7 (Ct App 1993 .)

"To prevail on ineffective assistance of counsei, the appellant mu st shov, that

counsel's rep resentation wan deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him." State v
Pug fey, 12 8 idaho 168, 9 11 P ~ d 76 ! , c;ttng Strtckicmd

1·

TVa.shington. 466 U S 668.

104 S. Ct. 2052., 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1 984 ) Therefore, in this case ,ve must loo k at whet her
the attorney' s failure to file fo r a motion to sever fell belmv a sta ndard of reasonableness,
and the effect this had in prejudicing the defendant at rrial.

V

The District Court Erred by not g1vmg Defe ndant ' s proposed
inst1T1ctio 11 num ber Eleven ( 11 )

A. Standard ofRe,,few

The standard of review fo r whether a proposed jury instruction is properly given is
an examination of whether the District Cou rt erred, as a matter of law, in its decision. I.C.
19-2132 (a)

B. Analysis.
The defendants' attorney writes m his Amended Motion for New Trial (See
Addendum A) that he had obj ected to the Jury Instructio1 l l which was proposed and
later adopted by Judge Meehl at triaL, which reads:

f:NSTRUCTIO N NO, 11

A person has possession of something if t he person knows of its presence and has physical
control of it, or has the power and intention w control it . More than one person can be in
po ssession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to
control it
The defense had objected to rhis instruction on the basis that it shou!d have

I

info rmed the jury that "a person has possession of somet hing if the person knows of its
presence and has the power and intent to exercise dominion and control O\'er the
substance'' (Se e Addendum A) The cou nsel for th e dcfen:-c based this request on Idaho
Court of Appeals case decided in 199 7, Stare v Ro::xue11,sld, l 30 tdaho 644, 945 P 2d
I 390 (Ct App . I 997 )

The qu estion of what it meant to be in possession \Vas of crucial importance in this
case, as noted above, because it was the essenti ni question that the jury had to determine
W11ether Ms

Moskios or lVfs . .Martin dale, respectively, had possession, and a jury

question which was raised during deiiberation shovvs that they in fact considered this to be
a determj ning factor

I

The question tbey presented was, " If a defe ndan t knows that there is marijuana in

her home and does not remove the marijuana from her car or her home, or rernove herself
from the car or home in which t he marijuana is located, or advise law enforcenient o f the
m2.rijuana, does that defendant thereby have physical control of the marijuana·1 " (See Jury
Trial transcript, page 523-524 ) One can also tell from this question that they have
completely subsumed and meshed the two factuai situations of the codefendants as one
1-l

correct

1n

error
fairly

to

5

case

1 i

u,

is an accurate
intent to
)

147

a crucial

case
to

p

1S

as

standard. While the language has not beL'll speciti caliy adopted by the Idaho Supreme
Court, as noted in Judge }\1eebl' s memorandum Of ini on, it is still that \vhich was given by

I
I
I
I

the Appeals Court decision as noted above. A.nd while it may not be necessary in every
case to include this language in order to properly in struct on the law . in a case such as thi s,
\1-ihere Ms. \ .foskios · actions, knowledge, percep ions, and ability to control her situation

as the mother in a ·ehicl e witb her child were all und er ciose scrutiny to make the
determination as to whether her circu msta nces fi t ac1u a1 or const ru ctive "possession" that
a clear, accurate and thorough definition of the word \Vas crucial.
Therefore, shoul d th.is Court find that the definit ion as offered by the defendant
was an accurate reflectio n of the law, this case ought to be remanded to th e District Court.

VI

The Cumul ative Effect of the these errors ' ·arrants a new trial in Ms.
Vfoskios· case.

J\As Moskios asserts that. even (f these enors are not deemed to rise to the level of
prejudicial error \Vhen taken individually, the cumulative impact warrants reversal. "When

I

there is an 'accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itseif might be harmless, but
when aggregated the errors shovv' the ab sence of a fair trial,' the cumulative error doctrine
requires a reversal of conviction as the trial has contra vened the defendant's right to due

1

process." State v Payne , 146 Idaho 548, 568, 199 P 3d 123, 143 (2008) (quoting State v.

held, 144 Idaho 559, 572-573, 165 P. 3d 273, 286-287 (2007) Ms. Moskios asserts that

the cumulative effects cf the erro;-s in

· s case deprived her of her right to a fair trial. The

trial \Vas not limited to the facts of v,·hat had occurred in her particular case, but was
essentially a confusion of issues of four different defendants and their bad acts, where a
16

jury was left to parse through t\vo different lifrstyles , hich entailed varying levels of drug
dealing and profit, and l\·'ls Moskios' specifi c role ci s to the facts as charged in the
complaint were lost among it a[L A such, Jvls. Tvioskios asserts that thi s Court should
1

acate her _ju dgment of con viction and sentence and remand this case to the district court

for forrher proceedings

Conc!u.-.'ion
This 1s a ca se 'Nhere the cumula tive effect of the errors is actually the most
important reason wh_ Ms Moskios ' case ought to be remanded for a new trial In her
case_ to determine whether she was guilty of posse sion of the marijua na on December
1ou', 2009, the definition

f possession, and all of its complexities, w re of crucial

significance, because that was the crux of the matt er In addition, the jury \Vas either to be

presented with an ellti -e world of fo ur individ uals and their in volvement and profit from
illegal marijuana sales, or it was to be presented with a narrow ievv' of ,.vhat had taken
place on December 1ot\ 2009, with regard to Ms. Moskios only To avoid the prejudice
of the environ ment she was in, and the environment her friend s were in, the facts ought to

I
I

have been limited to those rel evant her in ol ement only, and her knoi,vledge and
dominion and control of the marijucuia thr..t was in her car as she dro ve on a six hour trip
frorn Oregon to Ida.ho.
Dated this4- day

orJLJ}:

, 2011.
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SA1viAJ~11-I.A JEAN MARTINDJ\LE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAJ--10, IN ,\.:\D FOR '11--IE COL'.c'<TY OF Al)_!\

THE STA.TE OF lDAJ---IO,

I

I Case ,'\os. CR-Ff_ ~-- 2U09--0U2. 3059
Ami
CR-- FT_--2009-(IU23062
I

Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

TARA :VU\RJE ;viOSKIOS, and
SA_,_\1A__.Yf1-I/\. JEAl'--' .MARTll\'D/1. LE,
Co-Defendanis.

I
I
I

COMES NOW the above-captioned Defendants, Tara Mane tvfoskios and Samantha Jean
Martindale, by and through their Attorney of Record, John )degna, who hereby request that, pursuant to
fda110 Crim111al Rule 34 and Idaho Code Section 19-2406(5), this Honorable f:oun order a New Trial

111

the

above-capboned CrU11JJ1al Proceeding
The Defendants respectfully asseit that,

111

addition to rhe reasons articulated m their Motion for

New Trial (and subsequently filed supportmg Affidavits) tl1at was ongmally filed on June 2, 2010, the
Defendants are, pursuant to IdaJ10 Code Section 19-2406(5), entitled to a new trial because " . the
court ... rrusdirected the Jut-Y in a matter of law, or .. erred

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

PAG E 1

111

the decision of any question of law arising

;vrOSK! OS/i\,[ART f\..\10TO[SM[SS 09-23-10

----·- ·
during the course of the trial "
Specifically, the Defendants assert that die Court's Jury Instruction :\:wnber Eleven (11) concerning
the defo1icion of "possession" maccur;1telv reflected the law on the subject The Defendants contend that, m
accordaJJce \Vith controllmg Case Law and Commentary attached to tJ1e rcle\'ant Pattern Jury Instruction, the
Court's Instruction Number Eleven (11) should haw, at a m1rnmurn, mformed the Jury that "a person has
possession of something if the person knows of its presence and had the po\ver and intent to exercise
dom m on ml(/ ton,'r1J! over the substance [emphasis added]"

,-\pp 1994) and Slate

1,.

S!atr v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 51'.?, 887 P 2d 57 (Ct

Pv1<1!jeuskl, BO Id,1110 M4, 945 P 2d 1390 (Cl App 1997)

/1.s Counsel for the Defendants argued at trial, it would have been most appropriate to adopt the
entire commentary foJlmving I.CJ I 403/'i., by instruccing tJ1e Jury that

"In order to establish possession uf a controlled substance, a defendant need not have actual
physical possession of the substance; the fS]tate need onlv prove that the [D]efendant had such
dommion and control over the substance to establisl1 constructive possession.
Constructive
possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused a.nd the substance ,s
sufficienrlv proven so ·as to gwc nse to the reasonable inference rhar the accused was not sunpJy a
byst:J.J1clcr but, rather, had the power a11d intern ro exercise dommion and control over the
substance."

A comprehensrve Instruction that discussed the difference between "actual possession" and

I
I

"constructi\·e possession" could also have assisted the Jury
made
that,

111

111

111

mtcrpreting and digesting the State's reference,

Closmg Pu:gument, to the term "Constrnctivc Possession".

Nonetheless, the Defendants contend

the very least, the Court's Jury Instruction I\:umber Eleven (11) should have included the phrase

"dommion and control".

I

AddicionalJy, the Defendants contend that the, are enticied to a new trial because the Cou11
U11properly responded to a written guescion ci1at was, dunng the course of deliberations, submitted to the
Court bv the Jury

The Defendants' object.ton to the Court's proposed response to the Jury's question was

noted at TnaJ.

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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DATED this _ _ day of September 2010.

IOH:.\ A.LECRJ:\
-\ttornev for Defendants
\foskios and :-fartindale

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

I HEREBY CERTJFY that~ on this_ day of September 2010. I caused to be served ,1
true and correct copy of the foregoing mstrnment, entitled DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, to the following named person m die manner 1nd1cated below:

c;abnel \:f. l-faws, Esq .
.'\da County Deputy Prosecutmg
J\ttornev
200 \X'. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fa.,: (208) 287-7709

0
0
0
0

U?'JlTED STXfES IV[/dL
F,\CSJM!LE TR.1\1'-iSMISSIOl\
J-L\ND DELJV! RY
OTHER:

- - - - -- - -- ~

JO J-Ij'\; _'\LEG RL\
A_ttornev for Defendants
;\fosbos and :1vlartrndalc
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l

THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
2
3
4

s

STA TE OF IDAHO,

6

Plaintiff,

,,

Case No. CRFE090023059/CRFE0923062

VS,

8
9

10

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TARA MARIE MOSKIOS and
SAMANTHA MAR TrN DALE
Defendant

11
12

13
14

Alleged Judicial Mi sconduct
This case was tried on May 24, through May 26, 20 l 0. Both defendants were live-in girl
friends of Brian and Carlos Pinto, two men who have been convicted of the drug trafficking

15

I
I

(marijuana) incident involved in this trial. The defendant raised the defense that while they knew
16

their boyfriends dealt in drugs, they were not involved in the "business" and did not possess the
17

18

I

19

drugs in question.

After a three day trial, the jury found both defendants guilty of felony

possession of approximately one pound of marijuana. Defendants have moved for a new trial,

20

contending that the court instructed the jury improperly in Instruction No. 11 , giving the Idaho

21

Criminal Jury Instruction defining "constructi ve possession" of i Ilegal drugs:

22
23
24

25
7 ~
_o
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J

)

T
1

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
2

A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence
3
4

and has physical control of it, or has the povver and intention to control it. More

s

than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence

6

and has the power and intention to control it.

7

I

8
9

As a visiting judge, I received a set of instructions prepared by Judge Williamson that had
been given to counsel. On the first morning of trial, there were no requested jury instructions by

10

the defense on the subject of constructive possession on file . The first time the Court knew that the
11

defense was contesting the validity of proposed Instruction No. 11 , was at the jury instruction
12
13

14

I
I
I

conference at the end of the second day of trial.
Without having time for a complete analysis, the Court decided to give the instruction
That was identical to Instruction No. 11 except that to find the

15

requested by the defense .

16

defendants guilty the jury would have to find that defendants had the "power and intention to

17

exercise dominion and control" over the marijuana (emphasis added).

18

19

Sometime during the third da y of trial, I realized that requiring the additional fact of
dominion would place an unfair burden on the state unless I also ad mitted at least some 404(b)

20

'

evidence that I earlier ruled should not at all be admitted. At the close of the state 's rebuttal, I held
21

a conference with counsel in chambers. At that time, I told counsel that because of the additional
22

burden put on the state, I would allow at least some 404(b) evidence if the state wished to do so.
23
24

25

The state stated that it did so wish. At that time. defense counsel asked the Court if it would stick
to its earlier ruling excluding all 404(b) evidence if the defe nse withdrew its request to give the

26
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r.
"dominion" instruction. I replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, Instruction No. 11 was given to
1

2

the jury.
The Court finds that there was no judicial misconduct or prejudicial error as to Instruction

3
4

No. 11. Since the time of trial, the Court has come to the conclusion that it was proper to give

5

Instruction No. 11, since the Supreme Court has never adopted the " dominion" portion that has

6

been adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, CF State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho, 356, 900 P 2d 1367

7

(I 995). However, the Court also holds that defense counsel was not coerced into withdrawing his

8

request for the "dominion" instruction. Instead, defense counsel conferred with his clients, and as a

9

matter of trial tactics determined to keep all 404(b) evidence out by agreeing to the ICJI instruction.

10

Alleged Witness Intimidating
11

Defendants also claim that the Pinto brothers were ready to testify to the effect that
12

defendants did not "possess" the marijuana in this case. They, however, had entered into a plea
13
14

I
I
I

bargain with the state, part of which was to testify "truthfully" at defendants' trial. The state would

l.S

then recommend a reduced sentence. The defense claims that when informed by the Pintos that

16

they would testify in favor of defendants, the police and prosecutor called them "liars" and

17

threatened to withdraw their agreement to recommend a light three year sentence and recommend

18

six years.

Because of this "intimidation", the Pintos refused to testify truthfully to facts

19

exculpatory to defendants.
20

The Court finds that this information was available to defense prior to trial ; and that it did
21

not call the Pintos as witnesses on the issues raised in the motion for new trial. Thus, this issue
22
23

again involves trial tactics, not grounds for a new trial.

24

25
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__Jf·

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for new trial is denied on all grounds.
2
3

Counsel for the state is to prepare a proposed order.

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s

Dated this

r

'1h.

day of December, 20 I 0.

6
7
8
9

10
11

12

13
14

I
I
I

15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22
23
24

25
26
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